Behavioral economics and its related area of study, behavioral finance, use social, cognitive and emotional factors in understanding the economic decisions of individuals and institutions performing economic functions, including consumers, borrowers and investors, and their effects on market prices, returns and the resource allocation. The fields are primarily concerned with the bounds of rationality of economic agents. Behavioral models typically integrate insights from psychology with neo-classical economic theory.
Behavioral analysts are not only concerned with the effects of market decisions but also with public choice, which describes another source of economic decisions with related biases towards promoting self-interest.
History
During the classical period, microeconomics was closely linked to psychology. For example, Adam Smith wrote The Theory of Moral Sentiments, which proposed psychological explanations of individual behavior and Jeremy Bentham wrote extensively on the psychological underpinnings of utility. However, during the development of neo-classical economics economists sought to reshape the discipline as a natural science, deducing economic behavior from assumptions about the nature of economic agents. They developed the concept of homo economicus, whose psychology was fundamentally rational. This led to unintended and unforeseen errors.
However, many important neo-classical economists employed more sophisticated psychological explanations, including Francis Edgeworth, Vilfredo Pareto, Irving Fisher and John Maynard Keynes. Economic psychology emerged in the 20th century in the works of Gabriel Tarde, George Katona and Laszlo Garai. Expected utility and discounted utility models began to gain acceptance, generating testable hypotheses about decision making given uncertainty andintertemporal consumption respectively. Observed and repeatable anomalies eventually challenged those hypotheses, and further steps were taken by the Nobel prizewinner Maurice Allais, for example in setting out the Allais paradox, a decision problem he first presented in 1953 which contradicts the expected utility hypothesis.
In the 1960s cognitive psychology began to shed more light on the brain as an information processing device (in contrast to behaviorist models). Psychologists in this field, such as Ward Edwards,[4] Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahnemanbegan to compare their cognitive models of decision-making under risk and uncertainty to economic models of rational behavior. In mathematical psychology, there is a longstanding interest in the transitivity of preference and what kind of measurement scale utility constitutes (Luce, 2000).
Prospect theory
In 1979, Kahneman and Tversky wrote Prospect theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, an important paper that used cognitive psychology to explain various divergences of economic decision making from neo-classical theory.Prospect theory is an example of generalized expected utility theory. Although not a conventional part of behavioral economics, generalized expected utility theory is similarly motivated by concerns about the descriptive inaccuracy ofexpected utility theory.
In 1968 Nobel Laureate Gary Becker published Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, a seminal work that factored psychological elements into economic decision making. Becker, however, maintained strict consistency of preferences. Nobelist Herbert Simon developed the theory of Bounded Rationality to explain how people irrationally seek satisfaction, instead of maximizing utility, as conventional economics presumed. Maurice Allais produced “Allais Paradox”, a crucial challenge to expected utility.
Psychological traits such as overconfidence, projection bias, and the effects of limited attention are now part of the theory. Other developments include a conference at the University of Chicago, a special behavioral economics edition of theQuarterly Journal of Economics (‘In Memory of Amos Tversky’) and Kahneman’s 2002 Nobel for having “integrated insights from psychological research into economic science, especially concerning human judgment and decision-making under uncertainty”.
Intertemporal choice
Behavioral economics has also been applied to intertemporal choice. Intertemporal choice behavior is largely inconsistent, as exemplified by George Ainslie’s hyperbolic discounting (1975) which is one of the prominently studied observations, further developed by David Laibson, Ted O’Donoghue, and Matthew Rabin. Hyperbolic discounting describes the tendency to discount outcomes in near future more than for outcomes in the far future. This pattern of discounting is dynamically inconsistent (or time-inconsistent), and therefore inconsistent with basic models of rational choice, since the rate of discount between time t and t+1 will be low at time t-1, when t is the near future, but high at time t when t is the present and time t+1 the near future.
The pattern can actually be explained through models of subadditive discounting which distinguishes the delay and interval of discounting: people are less patient (per-time-unit) over shorter intervals regardless of when they occur. Much of the recent work on intertemporal choice indicates that discounting is a constructed preference. Discounting is influenced greatly by expectations, framing, focus, thought listings, mood, sign, glucose levels, and the scales used to describe what is discounted. Some prominent researchers question whether discounting, the major parameter of intertemporal choice, actually describes what people do when they make choices with future consequences. Considering the variability of discount rates, this may be the case.
Other areas of research
Other branches of behavioral economics enrich the model of the utility function without implying inconsistency in preferences. Ernst Fehr, Armin Falk, and Matthew Rabin studied “fairness”, “inequity aversion”, and “reciprocal altruism”, weakening the neoclassical assumption of “perfect selfishness.” This work is particularly applicable to wage setting. Work on “intrinsic motivation” by Gneezy and Rustichini and on “identity” by Akerlof and Kranton assumes agents derive utility from adopting personal and social norms in addition to conditional expected utility.
“Conditional expected utility” is a form of reasoning where the individual has an illusion of control, and calculates the probabilities of external events and hence utility as a function of their own action, even when they have no causal ability to affect those external events.
Behavioral economics caught on among the general public, with the success of books like Dan Ariely’s Predictably Irrational. Practitioners of the discipline have studied quasi-public policy topics such as broadband mapping.